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ABSTRACT 
 
The analysis of the distributional impact of fiscal policy proposals often requires information 
on household expenditures and incomes. It is unusual to have one data source with high 
quality information on both and this problem is generally overcome with statistical matching 
of independent data sources. Typically, matching is conducted with any information common 
to both sources with a limited (or unknown) degree of success. In this paper Grade 
Correspondence Analysis (GCA) is investigated as a tool to improve the matching process. 
GCA draws out the relationships between the common variables to enable the sample to be 
partitioned into more homogeneous groups, prior to matching. An evaluation of alternative 
methods is conducted using datasets from the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES), which is 
unusual in containing both income and expenditure at a detailed level of disaggregation. 
Imputed expenditures are compared with actual expenditures through the use of indirect tax 
simulations using the UK microsimulation model, POLIMOD. The most successful methods 
are then employed to enhance income data from the Family Resources Survey (FRS) and the 
synthetic dataset is used as a microsimulation model database.  
 
 
JEL: C81 D10 
KEYWORDS : Statistical matching; clustering; income and expenditure micro-data; 
microsimulation. 
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Combining household income and expenditure data in policy simulations 
 
Holly Sutherland, Rebecca Taylor and Joanna Gomulka1 
 
Introduction 
 
Statistical matching and related dataset enhancement techniques (data “fusion”) have been used 
when a single source of micro-data does not contain all the information necessary for a particular 
task. The use of such techniques may also form part of a wider strategy for improving the 
coherence of national data collection and for the efficient and effective use of limited data 
resources. However, any review of practical applications of the methods, such as Cohen (1991) 
reveals that no major study has consisted simply of a straightforward application of a chosen 
algorithm. There is inevitably a substantial degree of ad hoc and problem-specific treatment. 
Despite over 25 years of history, statistical matching remains more of a craft than a science.  
 
Our particular problem is to create a synthetic micro-dataset containing information on both 
household incomes and expenditures. From the policy perspective both types of information 
are necessary for the analysis of the effects of the combination of direct and indirect personal 
taxes (Office for National Statistics, 2000; Redmond et al, 1998; Salomäki, 1996). Another 
specific example might be the imposition of Value Added Tax (VAT) on children’s clothes 
(which are currently zero-rated in the UK), combined with a compensation package for poor 
families which is routed through the social protection system.  
 
Most countries do not have single sources of micro-data including high-quality disaggregated 
information on both incomes and expenditures. The income data in most Household Budget 
Surveys is usually very limited and of relatively low quality. However, the UK Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES) is an exception. It contains both types of information and has been 
used for many years as the database of official analyses of both household income and 
expenditures.2 The FES offers an opportunity to evaluate experiments with imputation 
methods that may be applied to other datasets. The eventual aim is to impute expenditure 
variables into a second household survey dataset for the UK: the Family Resources Survey 
(FRS).3 The advantages of using the FRS as database for policy simulation using a tax-benefit 
model include a much larger sample size4 and detailed information necessary for the 
simulation of welfare benefit entitlement (such as information on savings). 
  
Section 1 provides an overview of statistical matching principles and introduces the method to 
be used in this study. Common variables available in both datasets include variables 
                                                                 
1 The research reported in this paper was supported by the ESRC Analysis of Large and Complex Datasets 
(ALCD) Programme (H519255052). Data from the Family Expenditure Survey are Crown Copyright. They have 
been made available by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) through the Data Archive and are used by 
permission. Data from the Family Resources Survey have been made available by the Department of Social 
Security (DSS) through the Data Archive. The ONS, the DSS and the Data Archive bear no responsibility for the 
analysis or interpretation of the data reported here. Thanks are due to Neela Dayal and Lavinia Mitton for 
considerable preliminary work. This is a substantially revised version of a paper presented under the title of 
“Creating Order out of Chaos? Identifying Homogeneous Groups of Households across Multiple Datasets” to the 
26th General Conference of the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth in Cracow. We are 
grateful for the comments received there. However, the usual disclaimers apply. 
2 See Office for National Statistics (1996). 
3 See Department of Social Security (1997). 
4  FRS is nearly four times the size of the FES: the 1995/6 GB samples contain 26,435 and 6,690 households 
respectively. 
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describing household characteristics and describing incomes. Although one might imagine a 
straightforward relationship between household income and expenditure, two factors inhibit 
its identification. First, there are measurement problems: incomes and expenditures are 
measured over different reference periods. The period for most expenditures in FES is very 
short: two weeks (Dayal et al, 2000). This means that while on average measured 
expenditures correspond to those in the population, in any one household we may observe 
atypical patterns such as zero expenditures on food or a very high proportion of fortnightly 
spending on a durable purchase (such as a car). Secondly, a linear relationship between 
household income and expenditure “can only be expected for a class of families homogeneous 
as regards tastes and needs and making their purchases on the same market” (Allen and 
Bowley, 1935, page 37). Our method of identificat ion of Allen and Bowley’s ‘classes of 
families’ is described in section 2 of this paper.  
 
Section 3 explains the matching process once the homogeneous groups have been identified. 
Section 4 presents an evaluation of alternative methods by comparing policy simulation 
results using both actual and imputed data from the FES. The impact of the policy changes is 
simulated using POLIMOD, the Microsimulation Unit’s UK tax-benefit microsimulation 
model (Redmond et al, 1998). Section 5 presents POLIMOD results using FRS and imputed 
expenditures and section 6 concludes.  
 
 
1 Statistical matching of income and expenditure: the state of the art 
 
Statistical matching started in the early 1970s. To our knowledge Okner (1972) is the earliest 
generally available publication on the subject. Cohen (1991) and Baker, Harris and O’Brien 
(1989) provide reviews of techniques and practical applications in the field. The problem in a 
nutshell is as follows. We have sample A with variables (X,Y) and sample B with variables 
(X,Z). We want to create data C with variables (X,Y,Z) by merging records from A and B 
with close values of X. This is legitimate if Y and Z are related to each other only through X, 
i.e. if, conditionally on X, Y and Z are independent (Sims, 1972; 1974), or if relationship 
between Y and Z is known from other sources (for example, estimated from a different 
sample) and incorporated into the matching process (Paass, 1986). Under the assumption of 
conditional independence (which in practice can rarely be checked), a number of 
computational techniques for finding 'good' matches are available. Usually the samples are 
divided into cells by values of X and matches allowed only within cells.  
 
The key problem for matching and imputation is classifying the samples into homogeneous 
groups, with the definition of similarity between households depending on the variables 
which are going to be imputed. In this case, these would be households with similar patterns 
of expenditures. The most commonly used method is defining groups as cells in a cross-
tabulation of common variables. However, compromises have to be made in definition of 
cells between the desire to match records with very close (ideally, identical) values of X, and 
not creating cells with small numbers of observations. Thus in general, there is a need to 
identify groups that are different from 'straight-edged' cells, that is, groups other than those 
produced by a contingency table. 
 
One method is simply to use regression on the whole sample. However, this involves an 
important limitation that does not apply to methods that explicitly identify homogeneous 
groups of households and then match individual records within the groups. The number of 
variables that may be estimated separately is limited. In particular, expenditure va
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either need to have no zero entries or the treatment of zeros needs to take account of the fact 
that they may be genuine zeros or may occur only as a result of the short period for recording 
spending. Where many variables are needed at a high level  of disaggregation and where zero 
expenditures are important to identify from a policy point of view, individual record matching 
is the only suitable approach.5 
 
In order to identify groups of similar households within which to match across datasets we 
have used Grade Correspondence Analysis (GCA). The method draws out the relationships 
between the common variables which are subsequently used to define clusters. Households 
are ordered to maximise the dependencies between household characteristics (as measured by 
the common variables) so that adjacent households are relatively more similar than 
households further apart. As far as we are aware, this method has not been used before in a 
statistical matching exercise, although it has been applied successfully in a number of 
practical studies of other types, for example Ciok et al. (1997), Ciok (1998), Szczesny and 
Pleszczynska (1997), Szczesny et al. (1998). 
 
GCA as it applies to two-dimensional contingency tables is fully documented in Ciok et al. 
(1995). The purpose of the algorithm is to reorder the rows and columns of the table in a way 
which maximises a certain measure of dependence between the tabulated variables, namely 
the Spearman’s Rho (r*). It proceeds by alternate permutations of the rows and columns. The 
rule for choosing the next permutation guarantees that r* is increased at each step. The 
algorithm stops when the rule cannot produce further improvements. Termination of the 
process does not mean that the greatest possible r* has been reached. At the moment there is 
no method which would guarantee achieving the globally maximal r*, short of trying all 
possible permutations of rows and columns, which is not a practical proposition for even 
moderately sized tables. In practice we increase the chances of finding the maximal r* by 
running the algorithm a number of times on tables that have different starting orderings. 
Typically, before the algorithm is applied the rows and columns of the table are reordered 
randomly. 
 
The primary effect of GCA is maximising r*.6 Another effect is putting rows with similar 
values of characteristics close to each other. Thus, the relatively similar groups emerge. For 
more information about GCA see Taylor (2000). 
 
 
2 Identifying homogeneous groups of FES households 
 
GCA is used in three steps. First, using only variables common to both FES and FRS (except 
income) we attempted to define relatively homogeneous groups of households for FES95/6. 
Five types of common variable are considered:  
1. Basic information about the sample (sampling month and region).  
2. Demographic information: some variables are at the person level (age, sex and marital 
status) and some are at the household level (household composition - using two alternative 
definitions of children; age of oldest person; sex of oldest person).  
                                                                 
5 For example, we might wish to explore the impact on poor families of an equalisation of tax treatments of 
petrol and diesel fuel. This would require that spenders and non-spenders on each type of fuel could be identified 
separately. 
6 However, r* cannot be compared across tests that use different variables. 
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3. Household dwelling descriptions (category of dwelling; tenure type; total number of 
rooms).  
4. Potentially useful linking variables describing ownership of durables of various types.  
5. Individual labour market activity, at the person level (usual weekly hours, employment 
status; socio-economic group of the head of household).7 
 
A priori, the relative effectiveness of any combination of variables, or transformations of 
them, is unknown. As recommended by Baker, Harris and O’Brien (1989) to improve 
matching efficiency the pool of variables was chosen using regressions. The variables that 
exhibited predictive power across four selected expenditure categories were selected. The 
expenditure categories - items with VAT at 17.5%, items exempt from VAT, food, and 
transport – were chosen on the basis of their lack of zero values. The regressions not only 
eliminated the variables exhibiting the weakest relationship to expenditures, they were also 
informative about the form and level of aggregation of the selected variables.  
 
Interestingly, the regression analysis eliminated variables that are regularly used in statistical 
matching. These included the age of the head of the household, and dummy variables 
counting the numbers of adults and children disaggregated by age. Some of the information 
was rejected in its most disaggregate form. For example, region performed better when 
grouped into three categorical variables by the average level of total expenditure in each 
region. The employment status information was most effective when the categories employed 
and self-employed, and sick, unemployed, and unoccupied were merged together to form two 
categorical variables instead of five. For car use, a continuous variable (number of cars) was 
rejected in favour of categorical variables to pick up a non-linear relationship between 
expenditure and car use (0, 1 and 2+ cars). In contrast, the continuous variable counting the  
number of children in the household was chosen over a categorical variable indicating the 
presence of any children.  
 
Many alternative sets of cluster definitions were produced through experimentation, and to 
help choose between them GCA was used to identify the cluster sets that showed the strongest 
relationships with spending behaviour. (At this point we had no direct evidence that any of 
our clusters were indeed related to expenditure patterns.)  
 
First, GCA was applied to disaggregated expenditure variables to define groupings of 
households according to their expenditure patterns. Expenditure var iables were defined on the 
basis of their use by POLIMOD for indirect tax simulation.8 The optimal ordering of 
expenditure categories identified by GCA was found to be meaningful in the sense that items 
of expenditure at one end of the ordering were associated with high proportions of 
expenditure in poorer households (tobacco products, zero-rated food, domestic fuel) while 
categories of spending at the other end of the ordering might be expected to make up a higher 
proportion of total expenditure in more wealthy households (motoring expenditure, wine and 
champagne, household services). It is tempting to conclude that GCA can identify links 
between categories of expenditure that may help to distinguish between households with 
different lifestyles and spending patterns.  
                                                                 
7 See Dayal et al (2000) for details of how these variables were constructed. Stringent criteria for the sameness of 
variables were used and although the two surveys are similar in many respects it proved surprisingly difficult to 
define identical variables in each. 
8 The 27 variables are listed in Appendix 1 and their derivation is described in Mitton (1998). Our method would 
have been equally appropriate if we had wished to impute directly from the FES database the full set of 400 
disaggregated expenditure variables. 
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Finally, GCA was used to see how the two types of groupings relate to each other. The sets of 
household characteristic clusters that exhibited the strongest relations with the expenditure 
groupings were chosen for subsequent matching attempts. For more information and 
illustrations of how this was done see Taylor et al (2001) and Taylor (2000). Appendix 2 
shows the three chosen cluster definitions and the sample proportions in the FES and FRS 
datasets. 
 
 
3 Matching 
 
Having identified similar groups of households in each of the datasets the households within 
each group are ranked by household income. Then they are sequentially matched, starting 
with the lowest income household from a donor cluster matched to the lowest income 
household in the equivalently defined cluster in the recipient file. We call this ‘rank by 
income’ matching. Households from any recipient cluster receive expenditure variables only 
from the corresponding donor cluster. If the size of the donor and recipient clusters were the 
same, then one donor household would provide expenditure variables for one recipient 
household. In any other case, when the sample size of the clusters in the donor and recipient 
files are unequal, the appropriate proportions of variables from neighbouring households are 
taken from donor to recipient dataset. 
  
The ‘rank by income’ method can be augmented using common variables that have not been 
used to define clusters. Within clusters, households can be ranked by another variable (e.g. the 
number of adul ts in the household) before ranking by income within the new sub-categories. 
Matching is performed across the re-ordered clusters. However, re-ranking the households 
may disrupt the matching. Since the number of households in a corresponding sub-category in 
each dataset is unlikely to be identical, this will allow high-income households to be matched 
with low-income households. A second method avoids this problem by splitting clusters by 
the extra information and then ranking by income and matching proceeds within the split 
clusters. The potential disadvantage of splitting the clusters is the decrease in the donor 
sample size.  
 
 
4 Evaluation using Family Expenditure Survey 
 
No formal statistical tests exist to distinguish between the alternative sets of imputed data. 
Our evaluation relies on comparison of microsimulation model results when imputed 
expenditure data are used, in relation to results based on actual expenditure data. Comparisons 
were made using FES data from a two-year sample (94/5 and 95/6). Expenditures were 
imputed from one (random) half of the combined sample into the other half. Then the roles of 
donor and recipient were reversed, providing an actual and an imputed set of expenditures for 
each household in the combined sample. Many alternative sets of imputed data were 
generated.  
 
The main method of evaluation was to compare the outcome of simulated changes in indirect 
tax policy across the distribution of equivalised household income (using the modified OECD 
equivalence scale and counting each household once in the ranking). Although the 
expenditure data varies between each comparison, a common micro-database for household 
income and characteristics variables is used in all of the estimations. FES data are updated to 
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2000/1 prices and incomes, and use 2000/1 UK tax and social security policy as a starting 
point. All simulations use the data re-weighted to represent the national population. In 
calculating the impact of the tax change, it is assumed that households do not change quantity 
of goods bought.  
 
The first policy change involved simulating the removal of Value Added Tax (VAT) from all 
goods (“novat”). This was designed to test whether the imputed distribution of goods and 
services that attract VAT reproduces the distribution of actual expenditure on this group of 
goods and services. The second simulation  - called “revneut” - found the revenue-neutral rate 
of VAT that would apply if all goods and services were subject to the same, uniform rate 
(many goods are currently zero-rated or exempt; most VAT is charged at 17.5%). This 
resulted in some households gaining and some losing, depending on their spending patterns. 
The proportion in each group, as well as the estimated revenue-neutral VAT rate provided us 
with examples of estimates that are commonly used by policy makers, and which at the same 
time were likely to be sensitive to differences in patterns of expenditure. 
 
The very extensive comparisons of POLIMOD output using actual FES expenditures and 
different imputed datasets are described in Taylor et al (2001). Box 1 lists the main 
imputations discussed here. These variations were designed to test whether:  
(a) pre-match clustering of households improves on un-clustered `rank by income’ 
matching and there were any differences in the three al ternative sets of cluster 
definitions.  
(b) the choice of variable used to rank within clusters has any affect 
(c) the performance of pre-match clustering can be improved by introducing additional 
information within each cluster. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sampling error is one influence explaining differential effects across datasets. The size of this 
effect was used as a benchmark to provide some indication of the importance of the 
differences between imputations and between results based on imputed and actual data. The 
actual data were split randomly into two equally sized samples and used to generate two 
equivalent sets of POLIMOD results.  
 
Aggregate results are summarised in Tables 1 and 2 and selected results are illustrated in 
Figures 1 to 5.  
 
 
Box 1: Summary of imputations 
   
Name  Clusters Ranking and splitting within clusters 
Impf1 Unclustered Rank by household disposable income (hhdispy) 
Impf2a Test42b.1 Rank by hhdispy 
Impf2b Test42b.2 Rank by hhdispy 
Impf2c Test41.1 Rank by hhdispy 
Imp2aex  Test42b.1 Rank donor by total expenditure, receiver by hhdispy 
Impf7 Test42b.1 Rank by children then hhdispy 
Impf9 Test42b.1 Customised split then rank by hhdispy 
Impf13 Test42b.1 Split by children then rank by hhdispy 
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(a) Pre-match clustering and differences between cluster definitions 
Rows 4, 5 and 6 of tables 1 and 2 show results for three pre-match clustered imputed datasets. 
The cluster definitions are described in Appendix 2. These results may be contrasted with 
those based on actual expenditure data (row 1) and those based on expenditures imputed by 
ranking by income and matching across whole datasets, without clustering (row 2). We can 
see that:  
· Mean total expenditure is very similar across all five variants (to be expected, given the 
imputation method), although the variation is somewhat less in the clustered datasets than 
in the un-clustered or the actual expenditure data (Table 1). 
· The share of total expenditure across the distribution of household income is much closer 
in the three clustered datasets to the actual than in the un-clustered dataset, which over-
estimates the share of the high income groups and underestimates the share of expenditure 
among those on low incomes (Table 1). 
· The aggregate effects of simulated policy changes are also similar across the five 
alternatives. Estimates of the change in indirect tax revenue when VAT is abolished, the 
revenue-neutral rate of uniform VAT and the proportion of households losing on the 
introduction of a uniform rate are all within 1.5% of the actual estimates (Table 2).  
· There is little to choose between the three sets of clusters in terms of the aggregate results 
shown in these tables. 
 
The estimated impact of novat across the income distribution was analysed using boxplots of 
the VAT paid by households disaggregated by household income decile groups. Figure 1 
shows the distributional impact using the five alternative expenditure datasets. The line 
through the centre of the boxes in the plots represents the median, the box represents the inter-
quartile range, and the whiskers reach out to the lowest and highest values (excluding outliers 
which are defined as more than 1.5 times the third quartile above the box and 1.5 times the 
first quartile below the box). 
· There is a noticeable difference in the median of un-clustered estimates (VAT1) and the 
actual values in the bottom and top decile groups.  
· There is little to chose between the clustered estimates. Although some perform better 
than others in some decile groups, performance is not consistent across the whole income 
distribution. On the whole, Impf2a (VAT2A) looks closest to the estimates based on actual 
data. 
  
While the imputations may perform reasonably well for the whole sample, the same is not 
always the case for sub-groups. Figure 2 shows the median change in VAT within each decile 
group under revneut, focusing on households with children and shows that: 
· None of the imputations capture the high median loss among households with children in 
the top decile group.  
· The un-clustered data (VAT1) do not replicate the actual data well. 
· The different cluster definitions result in different estimates.   
· Impf2a (VAT2A) performed less well than the other two imputed datasets based on pre-
match clustering.  
· The best-performing dataset is Impf2c which was based on clusters that include presence 
of children in their definition.  
 
(b) Choice of ranking variable 
The baseline definition of income used as the ranking variable before matching is household 
disposable income after committed expenditures i.e. minus income tax, National Insurance 
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contributions and housing costs.9 Four alternative income definitions are used to explore the 
sensitivity of the estimates: disposable income before housing costs, disposable income after 
housing costs per adult and equivalised disposable income after housing costs. Two 
alternative equivalence scales were used: the modified OECD scale and McClements scale. 
We found that the particular definition of income does not affect the distributional estimates 
significantly. However the conclusions are quite different when two differently defined 
variables are used to rank the donor and receiver samples. Figure 3 compares the effect of un-
clustered matching (VAT1) and with clustered matching using the same income variable to 
rank both samples (VAT2A) with an imputation using the same clusters but with households 
ranked within clusters by income in the recipient dataset and total expenditure in the donor 
dataset. This clearly demonstrates that in nearly all respects the imputed data using different 
ranking variables (VAT2aex) is less like the actual data than either of the alternatives. The 
results suggest that caution should be exercised in ranking the donor and receiver samples by 
different variables, but that if the income variable used for ranking is the same in both 
datasets, its exact definition is of little importance. 
 
(c) Adding information to pre-match clustering  
These experiments are illustrated with reference to the sub-sample of households with 
children. Three distinct ways of introducing information on children are explored. The first is 
to include the presence of children in the cluster definition (Impf2c). The second is to rank 
households by the presence of children within each cluster, then rank by income within the 
categories in each cluster and then match within whole clusters. (In this case the base cluster 
definition - Impf2a - does not include children.) The third method is to split clusters (Impf2a) 
according to the presence of children and to match within sub-clusters. Figure 4 contrasts 
results for novat using the three approaches, with the results using actual data and results 
using pre-match clustering not involving information about children.  
· Ranking by children and then matching (VAT7) performs very badly. This is because this 
method allows some high income households with (without) children to be matched with 
low-income households with (without) children.10  
· Clustering using child information (VAT2C) is better than clustering without child 
information (VAT2A) when households with children are the focus. 
· Splitting clusters (that do not depend on children) by presence of children (VAT13) 
performs best for this sub-group. 
 
To consider the results in relation to sampling error, the sample is split randomly into two. 
The actual and imputed data estimates calculated from sample 1 are compared directly to the 
actual data estimates from sample 2. The change in indirect tax from policy revneut is 
examined over quantiles of the distribution of household income. The households that gain 
and lose because of the policy change have been separated, and Figure 5 only shows the 
losers. Kernel regression is used to smooth the curves to reduce the impact of extreme values 
and to make the charts readable.11 All variables have been weighted to represent the 
population. The figure shows that there is a substantial amount of variation between the two 
samples of actual data compared with the differences between results using the actual and 
imputed estimates. There is little difference between the sets of results using imputed data in 
Figure 5.  
 
                                                                 
9 For a full definition see Dayal et al (2000). 
10 For an explanation of how this occurs see Taylor et al (2000). 
11 A linear weight of decreasing importance is used to include the impact of the surrounding points. 
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Three alternative imputation methods were selected to be implemented with FRS data: Impf2a 
(pre-match clusters not including children in their definitions), Impf2c (pre-match clusters 
including child information) and Impf13 (the same as Impf2a but with clusters split into 
households with and without children).  
 
 
5 Imputation of expenditures into Family Resources Survey data  
 
Three policy simulations are used to provide results using FRS with imputed expenditures 
that could be compared with POLIMOD results using actual FES data. As well as the two 
already considered (novat and revneut), a third policy change - the imposition of VAT on 
children’s clothes (child-cloth) - is used. This is designed to test the performance of the 
imputations in relation to a relatively small component of expenditure of particular relevance 
to an identifiable sub-group of households.   
 
In comparing results using FES with those using FRS and imputed expenditures it is 
important to remember that the expenditure data are not the only source of difference. We 
have found that, although the surveys are similar in many respects, the distributions of 
household income are significantly different (Dayal et al, 2000). FRS incomes are lower than 
FES incomes on average, but for some sub-groups the opposite is the case.12 We would 
therefore expect the composition of income decile groups in the two datasets not to be 
identical. For this reason we would not expect the expenditures of (say) the bottom income 
decile group in the FRS sample to be the same as the expenditures in the bottom decile group 
of the FES. In addition, routine data adjustments (e.g. re-weighting to correct for differential 
non-response) and the process of policy simulation (e.g. the modelling of non-take-up of 
some social security benefits) may either exacerbate or mitigate these underlying differences. 
Thus, in the comparisons that follow we should not expect to find the same results using the 
alternative data sources. Rather, we can conclude that the imputations are sufficiently robust 
for them to be considered adequate for the particular purpose if the two sets of results lead us 
to the same policy conclusions. 
 
Table 3 shows the aggregate results using FES and enhanced FRS data. The results from the 
novat policy change suggest that the (weighted) imputed datasets contain less expenditure that 
attracts VAT than the (weighted) FES data. This is consistent with the somewhat lower 
revenue-neutral uniform VAT rates obtained when using imputed data and a slightly lower 
proportion of households losing when the revenue-neutral rate is implemented. However, all 
these differences are small and there is little to choose between the imputations. Figure 6 
shows the distribution of VAT across income decile groups, which confirms the similarity of 
the datasets at this general level. Figure 7 shows the average gain or loss in each decile group 
from a revenue-neutral uniform VAT rate. The imputed datasets all pick up the general 
pattern of larger gains at the top of the income distribution, but tend to underestimate both the 
loss at the bottom and the gain at the top. Impf2c seems to follow the actual relationship most 
closely.  
 
The differences between the results for the simulation of VAT on children’s clothes shown in 
Table 3 are larger. The cost estimate is between 8% and 15% larger for the imputed datasets 
compared with the real data. The imputed data also show a larger proportion of households 
being affected than the actual data. Al though the FES data show that 15% of spending on 
                                                                 
12 See also Frosztega et al (2000). 
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children’s clothes occurs in households without children, the estimates using imputed data 
suggest that this proportion is even higher. This is particularly the case for Impf2a which at no 
stage controls for the presence of children in the matching process. Without this control we 
find that 56% of the change falls on households without children and that only 42% of 
households with children are affected (compared with 58% in the real data). When the 
presence of children is controlled for, the results using imputations are closer to the actuals. 
However, the results shown here do not point to which of the two methods that control for 
children is to be preferred. On the one hand, Impf2c closely matches the actual proportion of 
households with children affected (59% compared with 58%), while the Impf13 estimate is 
too high (65%). On the other hand, the share of the impact on households without children is 
only a little too high for Impf13 (16% compared with 15%) but nearly double what it should 
be using Impf2c (29%).  
 
Figure 8 shows the average VAT paid on children’s clothes across the deciles of the 
household income distribution. The actual relationship is quite flat, but all the imputations fail 
to capture fully the flattening at the top of the distribution. Impf2a, which does not control for 
children behaves particularly badly in this respect. This is even clearer in Figure 9, which 
plots the same information for households with children only. Impf2a underestimates the 
effect, and here it is clear that it does so regardless of income level. The other two imputations 
follow the actual more closely, but at both top and bottom of the distribution Impf13 
overestimates, and Impf2c underestimates the impact. Overall, the policy analyst would 
probably draw similar conclusions from simulations using FRS data and Impf13 or Impf2c to 
those using FES data.  
 
Clearly, if changes affecting a specific group of households are to be modelled, the imputation 
method must take account of the characteristics of that group. In the case of tax on children’s 
clothes, children must be explicitly controlled for in the imputation. However, there are many 
groups of interest from a policy point of view and it is unlikely that a general imputat ion 
method could be found that simultaneously anticipated all such groups and was able to 
incorporate sufficient information. (The methods used here involved finding a balance 
between the number of variables and categories taken into account in the cluster definitions 
and splits, and in the number of observations in each group to be matched. If the samples are 
divided into too many groups before matching, it is made more likely that relatively high-
income households may be matched with relatively low-income households.) 
 
In addition, a full analysis of VAT on children’s clothes might require us to look at sub-
groups - say lone parent families, or those with pre-school children. In such cases it is most 
unlikely that imputation methods that simply controlled for children as a whole would provide 
results that were close to those from the original data.  
 
Furthermore, the example we have chosen - spending on children’s clothes by households 
with children - might be expected to behave better than most. The households that spend on 
children’s clothes are mainly identified by the presence of children - a characteristic that is 
observed and can be controlled in the matching process. In the case of spending on many 
other goods - for example, cigars or diesel fuel, each of which are taxed in specific ways that 
may be of policy interest - it is more difficult to find observed characteristics that predict 
expenditure.13  
                                                                 
13 An indication of the categories of spending that that may be difficult to predict using our method is provided 
in Appendix 3 which compares the decile shares of each category of imputed expenditure for FRS (using 
equivalised income deciles) with corresponding decile shares from FES data. 
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6 Conclusions 
 
It is clear that spending patterns, as captured by FES data, vary considerably from sample to 
sample.  This can be explained by the short reference period and the dominating influence of 
atypical expenditures. It means that it is particularly difficult to predict expenditure patterns 
that capture micro-level diversity, as exhibited in the actual data. Imputed expenditure 
variables are only ever an adequate second-best substitute for actual data when the variables 
are used at a sufficient level of aggregation to mask differences that are not controlled by the 
imputation procedure. Since we cannot say a priori what this level of aggregation should be, 
we can only be confident in the imputations when the dimensions that are important to the 
analysis have been controlled for.  
 
Our results comparing pre-clustered and un-clustered rank-by-income matching suggest that 
the identification of homogeneous groups using GCA is a fruitful approach, but that the 
dimensions of importance to the subsequent policy analysis should be included in the cluster 
definitions.  
 
If the purpose is only ever to produce results at an aggregate level or for large groups 
identified by variables common to both datasets (and used in the matching process) then our 
method seems adequate in relation to the benchmark provided by the results using two 
samples from the same dataset.  However, in many practical `expenditure-to-income' 
imputation exercises, the donor dataset does not contain precise or good quality income 
variables. Our experiments suggest that it is important for the ranking variable to be the same 
in both donor and recipient dataset. Where this is not possible it is likely that the imputations 
are of lower quality than those produced in our experiments. 
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Table 1: Share of total household expenditure by equivalised income decile group and 
imputation method 
Imputation Mean S.D. Equivalised household income decile groups 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 ACTR 13811.71 12743 4.80 3.92 5.60 7.46 8.69 9.94 11.66 13.56 14.62 19.73 
2 impf1 13811.65 12225 3.34 3.57 4.94 6.66 7.99 9.61 11.07 13.25 15.63 23.94 
3 impf2a 13803.41 11521 4.56 3.96 5.60 7.22 8.50 9.97 11.58 13.38 15.20 20.04 
4 impf2b 13801.62 11622 4.56 4.00 5.48 7.23 8.54 10.02 11.66 13.28 15.33 19.90 
5 impf2c 13788.75 11486 4.58 3.92 5.49 7.33 8.82 10.05 11.29 13.53 14.85 20.15 
6 impf2aex 13803.41 12675 2.74 3.24 4.51 6.08 7.34 8.99 10.77 13.03 16.03 27.27 
7 impf7 13803.41 11428 5.22 4.47 6.18 8.22 9.18 10.73 11.61 13.16 14.29 16.94 
8 impf9 13807.94 11643 4.56 3.95 5.65 7.26 8.73 10.07 11.38 13.43 15.02 19.95 
9 impf13 13804.60 11542 4.61 4.00 5.51 7.41 8.73 9.96 11.55 13.56 15.04 19.64 
Notes: Amounts are £/year at 1994-6 prices.  The modified OECD equivalence scale has been used to rank 
households. 
 
 
 
Table 2: POLIMOD output by imputation method, using FES  
policy change: “novat” “revneut” 
 
Imputation 
change  in 
indirect tax 
£ million/year 
uniform rate 
of VAT 
% 
 households 
losing 
% 
1 ACTR 37253 9.98 51.40 
2 Impf1 37479 9.96 52.17 
3 Impf2a 37393 10.04 51.22 
4 Impf2b 37432 10.04 51.28 
5 Impf2c 37354 10.06 50.72 
6 Impf2aex 37429 10.05 52.93 
7 Impf7 37303 10.07 51.18 
8 Impf9 37413 10.05 51.30 
9 Impf13 37398 10.08 51.42 
Notes: Results are expressed in terms of 2000/1 prices and incomes and are weighted to represent the national 
population.  
 
 
 
Table 3: POLIMOD output for three policy changes, using FES and enhanced FRS  
Policy change: “novat” “revneut” “child-cloth” 
% affected  
 
Data / 
imputation 
change  in 
indirect tax 
£ million/year 
uniform rate 
of VAT 
% 
households 
losing 
% 
change in  
VAT 
£ million/year all with children 
% falling on  
households 
without children 
FES 94/5+ 95/6 37253 9.98 51.4 625 22.6 58.2 15.1 
FRS + Impf2a 37021 9.85 49.9 720 28.7 41.7 55.7 
FRS + Impf2c 37009 9.85 50.0 694 27.1 58.5 29.1 
FRS + Impf13 37042 9.87 49.9 678 26.4 65.4 16.4 
Notes: Results are expressed in terms of 2000/1 prices and incomes and are weighted to represent the national 
population.  
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Figure 1: Estimate of VAT difference for households for policy change novat to examine the 
effect of clustering the data (full sample) 
 
Figure 2: Estimate of median VAT change for households for policy change revneut to examine 
the effect of clustering the data (households with children) 
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Figure 3: Estimate of VAT difference for households for policy change novat to examine the 
effect of ranking the donor sample by expenditure (full sample) 
 
Figure 4: Estimate of VAT difference for households for policy change novat to compare the 
way that information on children is incorporated (households with children) 
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Figure 5: 
 
Nonparametric regression of indirect tax change on income from revneut
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Figure 6: Mean VAT by household income decile: comparing FES actual with FRS imputed 
 
 
Figure 7: Gains and losses from a uniform rate of VAT: comparing FES actual with FRS 
imputed 
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Figure 8: VAT on children’s clothes: comparing FES actual with FRS imputed (all 
households) 
 
Figure 9:  VAT on children’s clothes: comparing FES actual with FRS imputed (households 
with chi ldren) 
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Appendix 1: Expenditure variables using FES 1995/6 by tax treatment   
Expenditure category Mean 
£/week 
 
SD 
% of hholds 
with +ve 
expenditure 
Current tax treatment 
(2000/1) 
1 Housing expenditure + household services + other household expenditure  23.90 54.23 95.0 VAT (17.5%) 
2 Motoring expenditure  12.58 65.47 58.9 VAT (17.5%) 
3 Food (which attracts VAT) 14.45 16.89 94.3 VAT (17.5%) 
4 Leisure goods and services  17.82 39.07 86.2 VAT (17.5%) 
5 Adult clothing and footwear  13.89 26.84 62.5 VAT (17.5%) 
6 Household goods + personal goods and services 32.99 48.70 98.3 VAT (17.5%) 
7 VAT-exempt goods*  45.76 113.19 98.5 No VAT 
8 Food (zero-rated for VAT) 39.19 24.08 99.8 No VAT 
9 Books and newspapers  4.09 5.23 91.8 No VAT 
10 Domestic fuel and power  12.88 7.78 97.7 reduced rate VAT (5%) 
11 Other zero-rated goods (includes transport and drugs and medicines) 8.44 85.19 79.1 No VAT 
12 Children’s clothes  3.55 10.36 26.6 No VAT 
13 Insurance premia 10.31 10.77 87.2 insurance premium tax only 
14 Beer  6.96 13.01 57.9 VAT + excise duty 
15 Cider 0.30 1.57 20.5 VAT + excise duty 
16 Fortified wine 0.37 1.30 19.2 VAT + excise duty 
17 Wine 2.11 5.56 40.8 VAT + excise duty 
18 Champagne 0.11 1.21 15.1 VAT + excise duty 
19 Spirits 1.63 4.84 30.3 VAT + excise duty 
20 Cigarettes 5.23 10.04 35.0 VAT + excise duty 
21 Cigars 0.14 1.36 2.2 VAT + excise duty 
22 Pipe tobacco 0.40 1.89 6.6 VAT + excise duty 
23 Motor fuel 9.90 12.41 60.7 VAT + excise duty 
24 Motor fuel (diesel) 0.79 4.25 5.2 VAT + excise duty 
25 Pools stakes 0.38 1.29 18.7 excise duty 
26 Other betting stakes 1.18 4.67 27.2 excise duty 
27 Lottery stakes 2.30 3.18 69.7 excise duty 
      
* includes postal services, life insurance, financial services, education, health, burial and cremation and  trade union and professional subscriptions.
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Appendix 2: Cluster definitions 
 
 
% 
 
% 
 
Clusters = 41.1  
 
 
% 
 
 
No 
 
Clusters = 42b.1  
FES FRS 
 
Clusters = 42b.2  
FES  FES FRS 
1 Single retired, rentunf1, no car 5.2 6.0 Single retired, no car, rentunf1 5.2 2+ cars, ownsome/ownall, workers, no children  6.2 5.8 
2 Single retired, ownall, no car 4.2 4.7 Single retired, no car, ownall 4.2 2+ cars, ownsome/ownall, workers, children  6.0 5.9 
3 Single other, rentunf1, no car 4.2 4.5 Single other, no car, rentunf1 4.2 1 car, ownsome, workers, no children, high 3.6 3.4 
4 >1 retired, retired&other, rentunf1, no car 1.8 1.8 Single retired, no car, rent or multiples of (1) 2.0 1 car, ownsome, workers, children, high 2.4 2.3 
5 1/2 retired rent, 2 retired ownall, no car 2.1 2.5 1/2 retired or 1 other, no car, rentunf1/ownall  1.9 1 car, ownsome, workers, no children, mid/low 5.1 4.6 
6 mixed bag - 6 2.0 2.0 Retired/other, no/1 car, rent/ownall 2.0 2+ cars, ownsome, work&other/retired  4.0 3.5 
7 Other, rentunf1/rent, no car 3.0 3.4 1/2 other, no car, rent 2.8 1 car, ownsome, workers, children, mid/low 4.8 4.2 
8 1 work, 1 work&1/2 retired, rentunf1, no car  1.5 1.7 At least one worker, no car 3.8 1 car, ownall, workers  2.8 2.9 
9 Single retired, ownall, 1 car 2.5 2.5 Single retired, 1 car, ownall 2.5 2+ cars, (rent, work or work&other/ret) or (ownall, work&other/ret)  3.4 3.3 
10 2 retired, ownall, 1 car 4.4 4.6 2 retired, 1 car, ownall 4.4 1 car, ownsome, work&1other  4.3 4.0 
11 1 work&1 retired, 1 work&1 other, no car  2.2 2.0 Mixed bag, no/1 car 2.0 2+ cars, no workers  1.3 1.3 
12 Retired and/or other, not ownsome, 1 car 4.2 4.6 Other, no/1 car 2.8 1 car, (rent, workers) or (ownsome, work&other/retired), children  1.9 1.7 
13 Retired and/or other, no car 2.1 2.1 at least one worker, no car, rentunf1/ownall  1.6 1 car, ownsome, no workers  2.0 2.1 
14 Single worker, not rentunf1, no car  2.6 2.7 2 other, rentunf1 or 1 retired&1 other, ownall, 1 car  1.4 1 car, rent, workers, no children 2.4 2.2 
15 >1 worker, no car  2.2 1.9 Mixed bag - 15 2.7 no car, ownsome, workers or work&other/retired  3.3 3.4 
16 1 work&1 other, not ownsome, 1 car 2.6 2.3 1 work&1 retired, ownall or 1 work&1 other, rentunf1, 1 
car 
 
1.4 
1 car, rent/ownall, work&other/retired, children  1.9 1.6 
17 Workers, and retired and/or other, 1+ cars 4.2 4.2 Single worker, no car&ownsome or 1 car&rentunf1  2.0 1 car, rent/ownall, no workers, children  1.4 1.6 
18 Retired and/or other, 1+ cars 3.1 3.2 1 work&1 other, ownall/rentunf2, or 1 retired&1 other, 
ownsome, 1 car 
 
1.4 
1 car, work&other/retired, no children 4.1 4.2 
19 Workers, rentunf1/ownall, 1 car  4.5 4.6 Mixed bag - 19 2.4 no car, rent/ownall, workers or work&other/ret, children  2.0 2.0 
20 Workers, rent, 1 car 2.4 2.0 2 work, no car, ownsome or 2 retired, 2+ cars, ownall  1.6 no car, rent/ownall, workers or work&other/retired, no children  3.8 3.7 
21 1 work&1 other, ownsome, 1 car  3.6 3.4 1/2 workers, ownall/rentunf1/2, 1 car  2.5 no car, no workers, children  4.2 4.7 
22 mixed bag - 22 2.5 2.6 1 work, rentf/rfree or 2 work, o wnall, 1 car 2.1 (no car, ownsome, no work) or (1 car, rent/ownall, other), no children  2.4 2.5 
23 Workers, not ownsome, 2+ cars, and 3+ 
workers, ownsome, 1 car  
 
3.3 
 
3.1 
Mixed bag, 1+ cars - 23 2.2 1 car, ownall, retired or retired&other, no children 3.9 4.0 
24 mixed bag - 24 1.9 1.6 Mixed bag, 1+ cars - 24 1.7 1 car, rent, retired or retired&other, no children 1.7 1.8 
25 2 workers, ownsome, 1 car  10.5 9.5 1 work&1 other, ownsome, 1 car  3.6 1 car, ownall, retired, no children (1f low/mid, 2f mid, 2 m/f low/mid) 3.7 3.9 
26 Single other, 1 other&1 work, ownsome, 2+ 
cars 
 
2.3 
 
2.0 
Mixed bag, 2+ cars - 26 2.6 no car, rent/ownall, other, no children 3.8 4.1 
27 Single worker, ownsome, 1 car  4.8 4.3 Workers, 1 car&ownsome, or 2+ cars&ownall 2.1 no car, rent, retired or retired&other, no children (not 29/30) 2.8 3.2 
28 3+ workers, ownsome, 2+ cars  1.9 1.6 All work or work and 1 other/retired, mainly ownsome, 
2+ cars 
 
2.6 
no car, ownall, retired or retired&other, no children (not 31) 3.5 4.2 
29 1/2 workers, ow nsome, 2+ cars 8.8 8.6 2 workers, ownsome, 1 car  10.5 no car, rent, retired, no children (1 m low/mid, 2 f mid, 2 f/m, low/mid) 1.7 1.9 
30    1 work&1 other, ownsome, 2+ cars 2.3 no car, rent, single retired female, no children, low/mid 3.1 3.4 
31    Single worker, ownsome, 1 car  4.8 no car, ownall, single retired female, no children, low/mid 2.3 2.5 
32    3 workers, ownsome, 2+ cars  1.5    
33    2 workers, ownsome, 2+ cars  8.6    
Notes: percentages shown are for combined 94/5 and 95/6 FES datasets and  for 95/6 FRS. Clusters using 42b.2 were not calculated for FRS.  
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Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
  car0, car1, car2 Dummy variables - number of cars used in HH (0, 1 or 2+ 
respectively)  
  children  Dummy variable - 1 if HH has children betwe en the ages of 0 and 
16 (or 18 if in secondary education)  
  dssad  Number of adults in HH  
  high, mid, low  Dummy variables - region of HH (high, medium or low 
expenditure region, as measured by CSO (1995)  
  ownsome, rent  Dummy variables - housing tenu re, aggregated (have mortgage or 
partown, rent). Omitted as base = own outright/rent free  
  ownsome, ownall, rfree, 
rentf, rentunf1, rentunf2  
Dummy variables - housing tenure (have mortgage or partown, 
own outright, rent free, rent furnished, rent from L ocal Authority 
or Housing Association, other rent unfurnished)  
  totchild  Number of children in HH  
  totfemal  Number of adult females in HH  
  totmal  Number of adult males in HH  
  totother  Number of adults with employment status of 
sick/unemployed/u noccupied in HH  
  totretir  Number of retired adults in HH  
  totsick  Number of adults with employment status of sick in HH  
  totunemp  Number of adults with employment status of unemployed in HH  
 
 
 
Cluster test labels 
 
The cluster tests have coded nam es that relate to the variables and the method used to define 
them. For example, 42b.1 uses variable list 42b and cluster method 1.  
 
Variables used in the test:  
· 42b = number of adults, adult employment status, disaggregated housing tenure and number 
of cars used  
· 41 = number of adult females, number of adult males, number of children, adult employment 
status, aggregated housing tenure, number of cars used and expenditure region category.  
 
Cluster method code:  
· 1 = systematic coding of household characteristic s, sensible definitions that are easy to 
recreate  
2 = optimal ordering produced by GCA is followed as closely as possible resulting in a 
number of clusters with long definitions that are not easy to recreate.  
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Appendix 3: Household income decile shares of expenditure by category 
(a) FES  
Equivalised household income decile groups  
Expenditure category  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Total 
1 Household services etc  4.0 4.0 4.3 7.5 8.1 10.1 11.5 13.1 16.3 21.0 100.0 
2 Motoring expenditure  3.1 2.2 2.8 4.9 6.1 9.3 15.0 13.3 18.7 24.8 100.0 
3 Food (which attracts VAT)  4.3 4.7 4.9 7.1 8.3 10.4 12.1 13.3 16.1 18.8 100.0 
4 Leisure goods and services  4.5 5.0 4.9 6.4 10.0 10.9 11.1 12.4 15.3 19.4 100.0 
5 Adult clothing and footwear  3.9 4.1 4.7 6.3 7.6 9.7 12.7 14.2 15.4 21.4 100.0 
6 Household goods  4.5 5.0 5.4 7.7 8.5 9.8 11.9 13.3 14.8 19.1 100.0 
7 VAT-exempt goods  3.3 2.1 4.0 6.0 5.4 7.6 12.3 15.8 17.0 26.6 100.0 
8 Food (zero-rated) 6.8 7.5 8.3 9.6 9.8 11.0 11.5 11.6 11.8 12.1 100.0 
9 Books + newspapers  6.4 6.1 7.4 8.1 8.2 10.2 12.1 12.8 13.0 15.7 100.0 
10 Domestic fuel and power  8.1 8.4 8.8 9.3 9.6 10.5 10.7 11.3 11.3 12.0 100.0 
11 Other zero-rated goods 4.8 5.1 4.6 6.5 6.5 8.0 8.5 10.1 12.3 33.7 100.0 
12 Children’s clothes 5.8 7.5 7.1 10.9 10.7 12.5 12.0 10.8 11.2 11.5 100.0 
13 Insurance premia 4.1 3.5 4.5 6.2 7.6 9.8 12.7 14.3 16.4 20.9 100.0 
14 Beer  3.9 5.2 5.7 6.6 8.2 10.8 11.9 14.7 17.1 15.8 100.0 
15 Cider 5.1 8.5 4.8 9.7 10.5 9.4 12.4 14.4 14.2 11.0 100.0 
16 Fortified wine  3.9 3.1 5.5 6.2 8.4 11.5 11.4 15.6 16.4 18.0 100.0 
17 Wine 2.2 2.3 3.8 5.7 5.5 7.8 9.8 11.6 20.3 31.1 100.0 
18 Champagne 4.0 0.8 3.8 1.6 6.0 7.6 11.6 10.7 20.4 33.5 100.0 
19 Spirits 4.2 4.6 5.9 8.4 8.2 11.9 11.5 12.3 16.5 16.4 100.0 
20 Cigarettes 7.3 10.6 10.2 10.4 11.0 11.2 11.6 10.4 10.2 7.1 100.0 
21 Cigars 1.5 4.9 5.3 6.7 10.0 9.1 14.0 7.7 22.8 17.9 100.0 
22 Pipe tobacco 10.3 11.9 10.7 11.1 14.3 12.1 10.8 9.0 4.8 5.0 100.0 
23 Motor fuel 4.5 3.9 5.3 7.4 8.5 10.5 13.3 14.4 15.8 16.6 100.0 
24 Motor fuel (diesel) 3.5 3.4 2.4 4.5 7.0 14.1 16.4 14.9 19.0 14.7 100.0 
25 Pools stakes 5.6 8.3 7.9 10.8 10.1 12.8 12.9 12.6 10.4 8.6 100.0 
26 Other betting stakes 5.4 9.8 7.4 11.9 11.4 14.1 8.4 9.7 10.4 11.4 100.0 
27 Lottery stakes 5.8 6.6 7.8 9.0 10.1 11.9 13.6 12.6 12.7 9.9 100.0 
             
 Total 4.7 4.9 5.5 7.4 8.1 9.9 11.9 13.2 15.0 19.4 100.0 
 
(b)  ratios FRS : FES 
Equivalised household income decile groups  
Expenditure category  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Household services etc  1.22 1.19 1.19 0.87 0.93 1.01 0.99 1.03 0.96 0.97 
2 Motoring expenditure  1.27 1.62 1.32 0.87 1.05 1.00 0.76 1.04 0.88 1.11 
3 Food (which attracts VAT)  1.15 1.11 1.06 0.89 0.94 0.93 0.93 1.01 0.97 1.09 
4 Leisure goods and services  1.11 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.82 0.87 1.12 1.09 1.02 1.01 
5 Adult clothing and footwear  1.05 1.11 0.96 0.90 1.01 0.98 0.87 0.96 1.08 1.07 
6 Household goods  1.17 1.15 1.04 0.88 1.02 1.01 0.95 0.95 0.98 1.03 
7 VAT-exempt goods  1.27 1.69 0.95 0.85 1.17 1.18 0.91 0.88 1.11 0.91 
8 Food (zero-rated) 1.01 1.02 0.92 0.90 0.99 0.95 0.96 1.02 1.04 1.14 
9 Books + newspapers  0.96 1.10 0.92 0.94 1.06 1.02 0.93 0.97 1.02 1.06 
10 Domestic fuel and power  1.03 1.07 0.95 0.96 1.02 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.05 
11 Other zero-rated goods 0.98 0.91 1.08 0.83 1.03 0.93 1.08 1.01 1.00 1.03 
12 Children’s clothes 1.04 0.94 0.93 0.69 0.93 0.92 1.07 1.21 1.12 1.12 
13 Insurance premia 1.17 1.25 0.96 0.96 1.02 1.00 0.90 0.98 1.01 1.01 
14 Beer  1.19 0.99 0.85 0.97 0.96 0.91 1.03 0.95 0.93 1.20 
15 Cider 1.36 0.66 1.03 0.74 0.75 1.21 1.02 0.96 1.09 1.28 
16 Fortified wine  1.32 1.63 1.04 0.91 0.96 0.82 1.02 0.93 1.04 0.99 
17 Wine 1.85 1.38 1.01 0.88 1.17 1.02 1.02 1.18 0.88 0.90 
18 Champagne 1.06 4.02 0.70 3.52 0.95 0.60 0.96 1.21 0.76 1.03 
19 Spirits 1.04 1.31 1.05 0.90 1.15 0.81 0.98 1.08 0.89 1.06 
20 Cigarettes 1.20 0.94 0.91 0.98 0.84 0.98 0.92 1.08 0.94 1.44 
21 Cigars 2.03 0.68 0.54 1.02 0.96 1.08 0.68 1.81 0.89 1.15 
22 Pipe tobacco 0.97 1.16 0.97 0.96 0.79 0.86 0.88 0.93 1.70 1.48 
23 Motor fuel 1.01 1.23 0.93 0.87 0.97 1.01 0.92 0.98 1.05 1.07 
24 Motor fuel (diesel) 1.43 1.05 1.81 1.22 1.10 0.58 0.83 0.92 0.99 1.33 
25 Pools stakes 1.10 0.89 0.80 0.91 1.05 0.87 0.92 1.04 1.26 1.24 
26 Other betting stakes 1.31 0.80 1.07 0.81 0.96 0.75 1.28 1.26 0.95 1.15 
27 Lottery stakes 1.00 1.09 0.92 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.84 1.02 1.06 1.31 
            
 Total 1.12 1.13 0.99 0.89 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.98 1.02 1.03 
Notes: shading shows differences of 15% or more  
